El artículo contesta a las objeciones críticas de Pablo Perot a la reconstrucción de los desacuerdos jurídicos que hemos propuesto recientemente, argumentando que: i) la teoría de la interpretación jurídica que subyace a la propuesta de Perot, centrándose exclusivamente en la fase aplicativa, no constituye una manera fecunda de abordar el fenómeno de los desacuerdos en el derecho; ii) que la reconstrucción de un acuerdo profundo entre juristas acerca de los criterios de aplicación de las reglas no permite al positivismo excluyente rebatir el argumento dworkiniano de los desacuerdos, ya que obvia explicar lo que ocurre en los
casos caracterizados por el desacuerdo interpretativo.

Abstract: The paper replies to the critical objections raised by Pablo Perot against the reconstruction of legal disagreements we have recently propounded. It does so, by arguing that: i) the theory of legal interpretation underlying Perot’s proposal, focusing only on the stage of rules application, is not a fruitful way to
address the phenomenon of legal disagreements; ii) the reconstruction of a deep agreement among jurists about the criteria of application of rules does notThe paper replies to the critical objections raised by Pablo Perot against the reconstruction of legal disagreements we have recently propounded. It does so, by arguing that: i) the theory of legal interpretation underlying Perot’s proposal, focusing only on the stage of rules application, is not a fruitful way to address the phenomenon of legal disagreements; ii) the reconstruction of a
deep agreement among jurists about the criteria of application of rules does not allow exclusive positivism to rebut Dworkin’s argument from disagreements, since it does not explain what occurs in situations characterized by interpretive disagreements.