New research in corporate finance and banking
- ISBN: 9780199243242
- Editorial: Oxford University Press
- Fecha de la edición: 2002
- Lugar de la edición: London. Reino Unido
- Encuadernación: Rústica
- Medidas: 24 cm
- Nº Pág.: 358
- Idiomas: Inglés
One of the common questions posed by researchers in this field is why security markets have such different roles and importance relative to banks in different countries. A related issue is whether these different financial arrangements matter for the functioning of the real economy. The first section of this volume approaches these issues by focusing on the functioning of the primary equity market, or the process by which compañies "go public", which marks the transition from complete reliance on bank financing to partial reliance on security markets. The second section approaches these issues at a "systemic" level, attempting to identify the comparative advantages of banks and security markets in solving the information problems involved in financing compañies. The third section explores the variety in the design of credit contracts and institutions, asking questions like: Why do some companies borrow from a single bank and others from several banks? Why do some banks share information about their customers? The final section illustrates that the same informational frictions that explain the design of credit contrats and institutions can also affect real economic activity.
Introduction, Bruno Biais and Marco Pagano
I. Going Public1:Why Do Companies Go Public?: An Empirical Analysis, Marco Pagano, Fabio Panetta, and Luigi Zingales
2:Underpricing, Ownership, and Control in Initial Public Offerings of Equity Securities in the UK, M. J. Brennan and J. Franks
3:Going Public and the Ownership Structure of the Firm, Antonio S. Mello and John E. Parsons
4:Toeholds and Takeovers, Jeremy Bulow, Ming, Huang, and Paul Klemperer
5:Underpricing and Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses in IPOs: Theory and Evidence, Michel A. Habib and Alexander P. Ljungqvist
II. Financial System Architecture6:Financial System Architecture, Arnoud W. A. Boot and Anjan V. Thakor
7:Banking Scope and Financial Innovation, Arnoud W. A. Boot and Anjan V. Thakor
III. Design of Credit Contracts and Institutions8:Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors, Patrick Bolton and David S. Scharfstein
9:Information Sharing in Credit Markets, Marco Pagano and Tullio Jappelli
10:Endogenous Communication among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives, A. Jorge Padilla and Marco Pagano
IV. Credit Market Imperfections and Economic Activity11:Survival of the Fittest or the Fattest?: Exit and Financing in the Trucking Industry, Luigi Zingales
12:Endogenous Cycles in a Stiglitz—Weiss Economy, Javier Suarez and Oren Sussman
Centre for economic policy research
