The article addresses three distinct, although related, questions: 1. A theoretical
question: is the law a system of norms? 2. A question about the method of
legal science: at what conditions is it convenient to speak of the law as being a
system of norms? 3. A question of sociology of law and history of legal thought:
what cultural and institutional conditions made it possible to speak of the law
as a normative system? In order to explain in what sense the law is a system of
norms, it is necessary to identify the cultural and institutional preconditions and
the methodological and epistemological consequences of the concept of law as
normative system. The article holds that the methodological consequences are of
the utmost importance: to conceive of the law as a system of norms allows us to
perform certain practical operations and theoretical observations which are essential
to our legal experience. If the law is conceived as a normative system, a legal
method can emerge, and a specifically legal form of reasoning can develop.