Among the extensive work of Hannah Arendt, there is not a title that resembles the one above. Her interests —from philosophy to politics, from her own phenomenology of the human condition to her take on modern revolutions— includes the legislative activity only on the side, as either a precondition or a consequence of politics. This is not to say that she was dismissive of the topic. In fact, she wrote on the topic of «law» on the way to develop her own interpretation of the Western political tradition. This makes the most interesting to read Hannah Arendt and the Law. The book, according to the editors —Marco Goldoni and Christopher McCorkindale—, is an attempt to initiate a «dual dialogue between “Arendtians” and lawyers, simultaneously asking the former “what does Arendt say about law”, and to the latter “what might Arendt’s work say to the law”» 1. The challenge of this task resides not only on the fact that Arendt’s approach to law was never methodical but also on the incisive distinction that Arendt makes between politics and law that has been obliterated by our political tradition.