The starting point of the analysis is the crisis of representation and participation that hits the modern democracies, causing the separation of broad grass roots from institutions and politics. In particular, the status of the model of majoritarian democracy is examined, on one side, for a theoretical reason, since it has been taken as a reference point to imitate, especially in Italy in the last twenty-five years, and on the other side for a practical reason, due to the application of original Westminster model to various continental European countries, though with various adaptations. The five countries taken into consideration (Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain) are significant experiences and are assimilated because the political elections were held in the last two years. The first element to note is the crisis of bipolar political systems (in France and in Italy), of the two-party tendencies systems, based on government coalitions with a hegemonic party (Germany), and of single-party governments supported by minor parties (Spain) which have moved towards multiparty structures. Only the United Kingdom seems to go in the opposite direction, thanks to the strongly two-party result of the 2017 elections, which, however, didn’t produce an absolute mono party majority. In the new political framework, selective electoral systems no longer guarantee the existence of certain majorities and the formation of stable governments. This is true for the correct proportional systems tested in Italy (where in the last twenty-five years four
different electoral laws were approved, two of which were partially declared unconstitutional), and for those applied in Germany (with the formation of the Government of the Great Coalition at six months away from the vote) and in Spain (where a minority government was formed). About the majority electoral systems, the English one had a selective but not decisive effect, as evidenced by the occurrence of the hung parliament hypothesis for the second time in the last three legislatures, while the French one was decisive (also thanks to the effect of dragging on the parliamentary elections determined by the popular election of the President of the Republic), but it has not been selective determining a multipartitism that calls into question some pillars of the majority model (left-right bipolarism and no influence of a center party). The greater political weakness of the governments doesn’t lead to a strengthening of the Parliament, but pushes the executives to use the mechanisms, that allow them to impose their political will. This is evident in Italy, but there are similar signs in the other parliamentary systems and especially in France, where the traditional state of subjection of the Parliament is genetic after the reforms of 2000/01 (reduction to five years of presidential term and postponement of the parliamentary elections to the presidential elections) and this is confirmed by the first acts adopted by the government appointed by Macron. Finally, there is also a crisis of the leader’s role, subject to a strong load of questions and expectations, that must be quickly disappointed with the consequent collapse of its popularity. In conclusion, the majority is no longer a model to be adopted and indeed the political and social complexity of many democracies dissuades the simplification inherent in the adoption of majority mechanisms.