The essay deals with the problem of the relationship between law and emotions, with specific reference to the moment of the enforcement of the law by the judges. Against some recent interpretations, the author argues that in Greece, since the law of Dracon, there was the transition from the conception of justice as revenge, typical of a competitive society as the heroic, to a conception of justice based on the principle of impartiality of the judge, expression of the new cooperative culture of the polis. In Oresteia, as well as in the judicial orations, there emerges the distinction between the personal motivation of those who accuse and the institutional function of the judges. If the accusers, as private subjects, could be filled with feelings of revenge, the judges were required to be impartial and to adhere to the principle of legality. This distinction has been questioned by some recent discussions and judicial innovations. The Supreme Court of the United States in 1991 declared eligible the Victim Impact Statements, previously always judged unconstitutional, through which the victims’ relatives can affect the verdict of the judges, prompting them to pass judgment with reference to emotional factors. In this way, justice returns to performing the task of giving relief and satisfaction to the victims and their families. The same reason is behind the creation of special rooms to allow victims’ relatives to see what happens in death chambers. More than 2,500 years after the Greeks ruled out revenge from the sphere of law, western legal culture returns to giving space to vengeful emotions, questioning a fundamental principle such as that of impartiality of the judge.