In more or less recent times there have been attempts to extrapolate from the Aristotelian political system individual principles or affirmations that could support its role as a precursor of modern «deliberative» or «participatory» democracy or «liberal democracy». These attempts are mainly based on two Aristotelian arguments, that of rotation in command, proper of the arche politike, and that of the defense of the «wisdom of the multitude» presented in Politics III 11. An analysis of the two concepts that is not limited to isolated statements of principle, but placing them in their dialectical context, shows that Aristotle interprets these principles, at first sight democratic, introducing in them elements of political hierarchy incompatible with the current democratic ideology. On the other hand, in Aristotle the phenomenon of democracy is presented in a complex and articulated
network of manifestations that goes far beyond the uniform platonic representation, negative in all its forms. The analysis of this system of government in the so-called «empirical books» (Politics IV-VI), while maintaining constant the evaluation of «deviant constitution» of Politics III, reveals however a «reformist » approach that tends to «save» the form of democracy that is closer for social composition to the positive constitutional types of the politeia and of the mese politeia. Ultimately Aristotle can not be considered in any way an advocate of democratic government in the current sense, but is open to recognize that with appropriate limitations to the exercise of power by the plethos or with social corrective measures, democracy can also be registered among the regimes stable and well functioning.