The paradigms of dynamic games play an important role in the development of multi-agent models in engineering, economics, and management science. The applicability of their concepts stems from the ability to encompass situations with uncertainty, incomplete information, fluctuating coalition structure, and coupled constraints imposed on the strategies of all the players. This book - an outgrowth of the 10th International Symposium on Dynamic Games - presents current developments of the theory of dynamic games and its applications to various domains, in particular energy-environment economics and management sciences. The volume uses dynamic game models of various sorts to approach and solve several problems pertaining to pursuit-evasion, marketing, finance, climate and environmental economics, resource exploitation, as well as auditing and tax evasions. In addition, it includes some chapters on cooperative games, which are increasingly drawing dynamic approaches to their classical solutions. This work will serve as a state-of-the art account of recent advances in dynamic game theory and its applications for researchers, practitioners, and graduate students in applied mathematics, engineering, economics, as well as environmental and management sciences.