Nuclear arms control in peril
why the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty matters and how to save it
- ISBN: 9781529247794
- Editorial: Bristol University Press
- Fecha de la edición: 2025
- Lugar de la edición: Bristol. Reino Unido
- Colección: Bristol Shorts Research
- Encuadernación: Cartoné
- Medidas: 21 cm
- Nº Pág.: 192
- Idiomas: Inglés
In this book, a former US Department of State senior arms control official critically analyses two pivotal nuclear arms control treaties: the established Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the rising Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).
The book offers a concise and critical analysis of the two, illuminating both their strengths and shortcomings. The author acknowledges the idealistic goal of the TPNW but argues that its immediate abolitionist stance lacks a roadmap for achievement. Instead, the book advocates realistic progress within the NPT framework. It provides twelve key negotiation topics for fostering meaningful dialogue among nuclear-weapon states, while emphasizing the urgency of concrete action in a world facing growing nuclear threats.
Nuclear Arms Control in Peril: Why the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Matters and How to Save It
Copyright information
Contents
List of Abbreviations
Acknowledgments
Preface
Introduction: A Tale of Two Treaties
one Three Pillars or One Foundation?
Peaceful use and safeguards
Article IV: peaceful use in the non-proliferation frame
Article III: safeguards against proliferation
Shaky pillars and the peaceful use conceit
Article VI: pursuit of negotiations
Reasons to negotiate, negative and affirmative
Overreading Article VI Two The TPNW Challenge
Origins of the TPNW
The provisions of the TPNW
Consequences of the TPNW and the missing negotiation piece
NPT and TPNW hand in hand-or the absolutists' triumph?
Non-proliferation abhors a vacuum
The TPNW's asymmetric effect
three Article VI Interpreted and Applied
The text and a post-Cold War question
Negotiation requirements generally
The negotiation requirement in Article VI
The 'pursue negotiations' clause
The 'effective measures' clause
four China and the NPT
'Breathtaking expansion' and missing response What the NPT does not do-and what it does
China's non-compliance with Article VI
China is not negotiating
China is pursuing a fait accompli
China's conduct aggravates the problem that China is obliged to negotiate to resolve
Calling out the arms racer
five What's Left to Negotiate?
The wide ambit of Article VI
Substantive issues for negotiation
Transparency
Confidence-building
Hotlines
Plutonium production and fuel-cycle accountability
Tritium limits
Safeguards for fast reactors and keeping the IAEA in the picture Nuclear testing-let's talk definitions (CTBT framework)
Nuclear safety
Export controls and nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon states
Institutionalizing the NPT?
The conventional-nuclear deterrence matrix: strengthening the whole by moderating reliance on the nuclear part
A northeast Asia strategic bargain?
Conclusion: An NPT Future and Bringing Realists Back to Arms Control
Notes
Introduction: A Tale of Two Treaties
one Three Pillars or One Foundation?
two The TPNW Challenge
three Article VI Interpreted and Applied
four China and the NPT Five What's Left to Negotiate?
Conclusion: An NPT Future and Bringing Realists Back to Arms Control
References
Primary materials
Treaties
Cases
Resolutions
Other instruments
Secondary works
Index
