The book is a collection of contributed papers in honor of Roy Radner. Reflecting Radner`s broad range of research interests, the papers cover quite diverse areas, ranging over general equilibrium analysis of the market mechanism, economies undergoing transition, satisficing behavior, markets with asymmetric information, organizational resource allocation and information processing, incentives and implementation, stable sets and the core, stochastic sequential bargaining games, perfect equilibria in a macro growth model, repeated games, and evolutionary games Contents: On characterizing the probability of survival in a large competitive economy.- Uniqueness of Arrow-Debreu and Arrow-Radner equilibrium when utilities are additively separable.Entry, productivity, and investment.- A model of Russia`s "virtual economy".- Reaction to price changes and aspiration level adjustments.- Bargaining solutions with non-standard objectives.- Investment and concern for relative position.Coordination of economic activity: An example.- Transversals, systems of distinct representatives, mechanism design, and matching.- Roy Radner and incentive theory.- Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation.- Majority rule with dollar voting.- Mediation and the Nash bargaining solution.Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment.- Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in repeated games nongeneric?.- Trust and social efficiencies.- Survival and the art of profit maximization