This book offers a distinctive overwiew of the internal and external forces responsible for the making of modern Japan. L. M. Cullen argues both that western writing has viewed the expansion of the west in an unduly positive light, and that Japanese policies and fears have often been caricatured. He shows that Japan before 1854, far from being in either progressive economic and social decay or political crisis, was on balance a successful society led by rational policy makers. In so far as there was a crisis, it was a fiscal one, as its 250 years of peace left Japan with an embryonic taxtation system rather than with the sophisticated systems developed by the European powers to meet the demands of their constant wars. When an external threat recurred in 1793, Japan war to put a new emphasis on its study of the west. Its policies also were to remain sonsistent, and it would display remarkable skill in its negotiations with the western powers in 1853-1868 and realism in relations with them thereafter. However, the failure of the 1890 constitution to provide effective cabinet control of the armed forces and the urge to provide security on the Asiatic mainland and sea alike against the western advance led to fluctuating and at times reckless policies. They would lead ultimatelly too to the country´s nemesis in China and the north Pacific.