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**FISCAL CAPITALISM
AND THE DISMANTLING
OF CITIZENSHIP
PUNO-PERU IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY**

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PREFACE

It has taken decades to finish this manuscript and I still continue having the feeling that it is an unfinished piece of work, that much more could be said, thought about, and written about. I will continue researching Andean history from a double angle, the fiscal realities on the ground and the construction of space and borders, expanding the analysis into the Amazonian basin. This research is currently under way. Diosito mediante, as a friend would say, I will be done after retiring from administrative duties. Teaching, however, will accompany me thereafter, hopefully bringing new research into the classroom.

Since archival research seems to take forever and is never really finished, on the way I have accumulated innumerable encounters, conversations, good advice, cheerful moments, conferences at a varied set of venues, workshops, seminars, class discussions, that all have led to affirm and question the various arguments contained in the present book. Also, I have received so much from colleagues all over the planet who —sometimes inadvertently— have become a part of what is proposed herein. I don't blame them for my eventual misunderstandings of their valuable thoughts... Most saliently, I have always felt accompanied by colleagues Nelson Altamirano, Heraclio Bonilla, Carlos Contreras, José Deustua, Paul Gootenberg, Nils Jacobsen, Brooke Larson, Florencia Mallon, Michael Monteón, Ulrich Mücke, Pedro Pérez-Herrero, Rodrigo Montoya, Steve Stern, Sinclair Thompson, Charles Walker, both through their presence and their research, some as my mentors, some as my mentees, some as both. Thanks, *muchas gracias* for what has been an almost lifelong sharing of ideas, questions, common and new grounds. I am sure you will find pieces of your own work reflected throughout.

Over time I have also accumulated some «monetary debts». CLACSO (Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales) provided funding for my initial steps into Peruvian archives. Later, these efforts were generously supported by the DAAD (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst) and the DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft), during and after shortly I finished my PhD at the University of Bonn. Later on, while being a visiting researcher at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos and a research affiliate at Peru's Central Bank in Lima, a Tinker Foundation Grant, allowed a team of researchers (Heraclio Bonilla, José Deustua, Carlos Contreras, and myself) to research Peru's monetization process in four distinct Peruvian regions. Back then, I chose Puno to be «my region», for

the same reasons I later continued to dig further into Puno's border history in terms of ethnic territorialities. Marcela Calisto and Nelson Altamirano helped to find and organize the prefectural archive in Puno. Puno's Prefecto Urbiola, himself an elementary school teacher, was instrumental in helping me find «*esos papeles viejos*», two rooms full of them on dirt floors.

Since I began my career at UC, San Diego, I have received several research grants from our Academic Senate that have helped me conclude this manuscript, while at the same time doing research for a new project in Bolivian, Ecuadorian, Colombian, Peruvian, German, British, and Spanish archives.

More recently, it was the lifelong Alexander von Humboldt Research Prize, that launched me forcefully into the new Amazonia project and also, ultimately, drove my decision to publish the present manuscript. Growing up in Lima, I went to the Alexander von Humboldt School. Full circle, over the years. From schooling in Lima to having the enormous honor of receiving the Humboldt Prize in Bamberg and Berlin/Germany in 2012, my parents (Helga and Joachim) and my siblings (Franziska and Jürgen) always stood on my side, not the least by their deep caring and love, their interest in my work, and their example.

INTRODUCTION

Having witnessed political change over the past decades in Peru and especially in one of Peru's 25 departamentos, Puno, I began this project with a simple but profound question: what was the long term trajectory of the events in the first decade of the twentieth century when indigenous people established their own city only to have the authorities massacre them by the thousands? Puno is located at the shores of Lake Titicaca on the border with Bolivia. I wrote this narrative with an eye on more recent events: the historical emergence of a guerrilla movement in Southern Peru in the 1960s, and in the 1980s of the radical Maoist Shining Path political movement out of the departamento of Ayacucho. What was it that in the 1990s led local indigenous leaders to resort to violent self-help when faced with the corruption of local state bureaucrats?¹ I decided to dive back into the nineteenth century to reconstruct the history of local power constellations and how they defined the relationships with the Peruvian state on the one side, and with the vast indigenous majority on the other, that is, the longterm build-up of political, official, fiscal, and cultural relationships between indigenous peasants and landowners, local powerholders (including priests and judges), and the Peruvian state in the making. More than explaining certain reactions on the side of indigenous peasants during a political or military event, I asked myself about the daily build-up of relationships with the state, preceded by another question, namely *where* do we locally find the presence of the state? The main answer to this second question is: the state is present through its bureaucracy (prefectos, subprefectos, gobernadores, alcaldes, hilacatas) from the departamento-level to the indigenous ayllus, pueblos, and communities; through its legislation, whether applied or not, concerning especially land tenure issues; through its demands, be they fiscal (headtax, contribuciones) or of a military nature (recruitment, provisions); and through its control of the means of repression and mediation. Those were the very aspects that brought the state closest to local realities, especially

¹ Several published monographs on similar issues tremendously helped in framing my own research agenda, especially Grieshaber, 1980; Mallon, 1983; Stern, 1982, 1987; Walker and Guardino, 1988; Walker, 1996; Thurner, 1988, 1997; Jacobsen, 1984, 1991, 1993; Orlove, 1989, 1990; Larson, 1992). Also those written by Andean colleagues, especially Bonilla, 2005; Manrique, 1987, 1988, 1989; de la Cadena, 2000; Méndez Gastelumendi, 2005; Barragán, 2013; Calisto, 1993; Albo, 1975; Platt, 1982, 1987. The very local histories recorded by what Gramsci would call "organic intellectuals", are listed as Puno Monographs in the bibliography.

in the nineteenth century². In the long run, the “presences” of the state weakened rural communities, indigenous peasants, and haciendas (big or small) in the name of a nation-state to be construed, and later on, maintained and defended. How did such state roles structure the mutual perceptions of state, local elites, and indigenous peasants? How did they lead into the kind of nation-state building that we observe emerging throughout the nineteenth century, in Peru as well as other Latin American nations.

Throughout the nineteenth century, politicians, journalists, and intellectuals shaped a two-tiered image of Peruvian Indians. Some described the dire living conditions of the indigenous population and proposed state intervention and reforms, especially the building of schools and the improvement of hygienic conditions, to better Indians’ lives; some decried the brutality with which Indians had been (and were) treated and exploited by hacendados, local bureaucrats, and priests. In this second image, the offered solution to Indian misery was the elimination of the exploiters. In opposition to these descriptions and claims stood the local powerholders’ rationale to use and justify the use of Indian money, labor, and land. Justifications went from denial to asserting Indian backwardness, inherent laziness, egoism, deceitfulness, and “bad disposition”³. Such images were a nineteenth-century invention.

In colonial times, Indians were the vassals of the king of Spain, they paid a headtax and worked the *mita*⁴ (especially in the mines) the terms of which were continuously re-negotiated at the community level in recognition of the natives’ diminishing numbers until the end of the eighteenth century. The king, in turn, protected Indians’ lands to ensure Indians would be able to pay the headtax and continue working in the mines. From very early on in the Spanish colonization project, Indians had access to courts and a legal representative (the Protector de Indios) allowing them to understand the translation of their grievances into the changing legal mindset of the colonizers. The tribute payments —re-baptized as “contribuciones” in the wake of the wars of independence— continued throughout the nineteenth century, without protection. And, this is the story I want to reconstruct, namely, what was the role of contribuciones in shaping the political,

² Also see Nugent and Krupa (2015) for an assessment of the cultural, symbolic, and ideological mechanisms used in the nation-state building in the twentieth century.

³ Local authorities often signalled an awareness of the multiple levels of extorsions Indians were subjected to. However, little action followed their awareness. Often, local authorities outrightly denied any “excesses”. On November 2, 1839, the subprefecto of Azangaro, Francisco Lizares, reported to the prefecto in answering whether Indians were forced to serve as “pongos y otros cargos”: “Aseguro á VS que en esta Provincia se cumple exactamente y se vijila sobre el particular de que ningun funcionario ecsija el servicio personal á los Yndijenas obligándoles forsosamente”. APPu. 1839:Az. Denial did not stop complaints from reaching courts and authorities. On March 8, 1877, Puno’s subprefecto sent out a circular to the gobernador of Paucarcolla [and possibly to the other gobernadores as well]: “Esta Subprefectura tiene conocimiento de los continuos crímenes y abusos cometidos en el Distrito de su mando por ciertos individuos contra la raza indígena. [Los indios...] continuan siendo víctimas escogidas de la ambición desenfrenada de inhumanas gentes que a mas de oprimirlos y estafarlos sin misericordia, les dan un trato peor que á las bestias sin omitir ni el látigo, ni el palo para hacerlos trabajar sin remuneración y apoderarse de sus intereses é hijos”. APPu. 1877:Pu 622.

⁴ The *mita* involved one-seventh of the adult male tributary population between the ages of 18 and 50 on a rotational basis.

social, and economic landscape. Gradually over the course of the century, the “contribución” turned into free services, mostly not for the new republican state, but for the local powerholders. It was how the state became more and more estranged from local realities and how the patterns of local accumulation—embedded in a racial discourse—evolved. Now and then, the tribute payments were a means to claim racial and cultural superiority and, thus, justify exploitation. In the nineteenth century such racially and culturally inspired images sharpened. However, the nineteenth century also witnessed the shaping of an Indian image of white and mestizo landowners and state bureaucrats. The images on local powerholders found their way into many testimonies, lawsuits, and descriptions throughout the century, and were—at the turn of the twentieth century—synthesized and “literaturized” in the writings of Cusco- and Puno-based indigenistas. However, what I found is that these once diverse images became more uniform through indigenista literature. Actions undertaken by someone like Juan Bustamante (the leader of the 1866 rebellion in Huancane) or Antonio Riveros (a longterm subprefecto) were quite distinct in their strategies and outcomes, and were perceived as such by the participating indigenous people. Indians’ political participation runs through the entire century in an open dialogue with local, provincial, and national powerholders, further underlining what we are ever more aware of: their active involvement in the construction of the state.

What happened in Puno in the first decades of the twentieth century describes the consequences of this active political participation. On May 4, 1917, several Indians from the distritos of San José, San Antón, and Asillo in provincia Azangaro, represented by lawyer Romero, in Puno-city, opened a criminal lawsuit against interim judges (jueces suplentes), Dr. Ygnacio Murillo and J.A. Pacheco Andía and subprefecto Don Daniel R. Zavala, in protest for a massive killing of Indians on December 2, 1916. Five months after the massacre, the state and local authorities had done nothing to punish the perpetrators. The appalling news had spread throughout the country and had merited thorough discussion and attention in nationwide newspapers. Among the newspaper publications was a lengthy editorial article written by Dora Mayer⁵, in which she not only protested against

⁵ “Que el día dós de diciembre del año próximo pasado tuvieron lugar en Azángaro, delitos que han manchado de sangre la historia del Perú. Centenares de indígenas han sido cobardemente asesinados por los empleados de varios hacendados, con la complicidad i encubrimiento de las autoridades políticas i judiciales; habiendo quedado hasta hoy impunes esos crímenes, tanto porque el Ministerio Fiscal no ha acusado, cuanto porque nosotros enfermos y fugitivos como hemos estado, tampoco pudimos denunciar y acusar como lo hacemos ahora. La opinión pública interpretada por los voceros de mayor valía, “El Comercio”, “La Prensa”, “La Crónica”, “Variedades”, “Integridad”, “La Autonomía”, “El Deber Pro-indígena”, “La Federación”, “El Pueblo”, “El Siglo”, “La Voz de Azángaro”, y otros periódicos, han proclamado ya a la faz de la República los sucesos sangrientos que nos ocupan, pidiendo unánimemente sanción para los culpables. Con este motivo ha escrito la ilustre escritora Dora Mayer: “La lectura de los extractos de periódico nos exime casi de la necesidad de renovar nuestros juicios sobre la situación creada por los gamonales del departamento de Puno”. En repetidas alusiones queda garantizada la figura funesta del gamonal, mayormente un advenedizo fundador de fundos i pulpo que extrae la savia de la vida de toda la comarca donde se radica; queda pintada tambien la desolación sembrada en la humilde campiña, por la hambre de dominio de los brutales conquistadores que quieren destruir la antigua organización comunal del Perú, sin pensar ni lejanamente, en sustituirla, si posible fuera, con un orden más moderno o adelantado. La despoblación, la degeneración moral, la apostasía a la Patria de infelices, ignorantes, cuyo único refugio pudiera ser una tierra más

the massacre and the state's inertia, but also described in detail the extortions (especially labor obligations) Indians were subdued to at the beginning of the twentieth century. She also reminded the authorities in Lima that well before the massacre, Indians, in a petition (memorial) to Peru's president had described, in length, the same abuses and had requested his direct intervention⁶.

The detailed description of Indians' labor obligations as presented in the memorial synthesizes much of what had built up throughout the nineteenth century. Labor was synonymous to unpaid or underpaid service. *Pongueaje*, *mitani*, *arrieria*, *semanero*, *mulero*, *pastor*, *faenas* were names that described the specific labor content and the requested service⁷. Aside from these labor exactions,

hospitalaria fuera de la frontera nacional o una intervención extranjera en ese segundo Putumayo del Perú, se pasean como fantasmas, como cuervos de negro augurio, sobre los cadáveres de mil aborígenes sacrificados por la apatía del Gobierno i del pueblo peruano, al neronismo de un puñado de ingratos i desgraciados hijos de este suelo, que no tiene el valor de repudiar una estirpe que la afrenta. Las causas inmediatas i que han dado márgen a la pretendida sublevación indígena que culminó el dos de diciembre del año pasado, son las quejas que desde Setiembre del citado año veníamos haciendo por las mil exacciones i atropellos que pesan como una maldición sobre el infeliz indio. No queremos pintar nuestra situación desde el Coloniage, ni es la oportunidad para hacer consideraciones sociológicas i descubrir la causa del mal que nos mata, i que redunde no solamente en contra nuestra, sino en contra de la salud nacional, dentro del marco de esta acusación que demanda laconismo, tenemos que apuntar hechos concretos solamente, que prueban la justicia de nuestra causa. Los servicios remarcables obligatorios, con todos los horrores de la antigua esclavitud, motivaron nuestras quejas contra hacendados Bernardino Arias Echenique, Urquiaga y otros. Esos servicios consisten, según expresamos ya en otra ocasión en lo siguiente: *Pongueaje*, *mitani*, *arrieria*, *semanero*, *mulero*, *pastor*, *faenas* i robo de propiedades". APPu:Az 1917.

⁶ Also see Zapata (1993), and for an interesting contrast Gonzales Prada (2003).

⁷ *Pongueaje* involved all members in a community. On a rotational basis each comunero had to work for one month ("a voluntad de los quipos") on haciendas taking care of all domestic duties, "like waiters in a hotel": tend the table, serve the food, provide the chinaware ("ollas, cántaros i otros objetos de alfarería lugareña"), the grease ("cebo") used as lighting fuel in the kitchen, and fifty loads of cow excrement to fire the kitchen. If something broke, the *pongo* was responsible for its replacement, often paying twice and three times the actual value of the broken item. To remind the quipos that the time of duty had elapsed, the *pongo* had to offer the quipo a bottle of alcohol; this offer was the "tincca", meaning—as commented by Azangaro's Indians—that they were "forced to celebrate their oppression".

Mitanis were the wives and children of peasants forced to prepare the daily food for the hacendado, his employees, and all the Indians working on the hacienda. To feed the sometimes more than one hundred people on a hacienda, at least five cooks were needed, which meant that peasant families with young or few children had to hire one or two people to provide this service. Hiring a woman cost 10 cents (centavos), hiring a man cost 20 cents in addition to coca and food these hired persons expected. In the *arrieria* version every peasant had to provide ten llamas to transport crops from the haciendas to the Pucara railroad station, in addition to food, ropes, lazos, saddle padding, and bags. A *mulero* was the person in charge of pasturing and take care of a portion of animals on the hacienda for a month. If anything happened to an animal, the *mulero* was forced to pay a penalty fixed by the hacendado. *Muleros*—as much as *pongos*—were expected to deliver a bottle of alcohol to exit their labor obligation. Being a shepherd was probably the worst labor service. Every peasant owing a hut (*cabaña*) was put in charge of pasturing 200 and more sheep or 40 or more cows on his own pasture lands. Mostly it was women and children who were in charge of taking the cattle to pastures and suffered the rigors of the altitudinal climatic conditions. When for any reason the cattle died, the hacendado would only receive back half of the dead animal, while the other half had to be repaid with animals taken from one's own herds. When the replacement did not take place immediately, the *mayordomo* and the *quipos* promptly showed up at the peasant's hut to take it. At the time of the recounting of the animals (*época del recuento*) and to "cover this unjust act" ("*cohonestar este acto injusto*"), the "*patrón*" brought gifts: one vara of castilla cloth valued at two soles of Bolivian money, a hat (*sombrero de paño*) also worth two soles, and sometimes one arroba of quinoa, a quintal of potatoes, an arroba of potato starch (*chuño*) or half a pound of coca leaves. *Faena*, finally, meant a year-round work commitment to build fences,

Indians of Azangaro described the several modalities in which their property (land and animals) and family members were attacked by neighboring hacendados: requisition of their animals for transport purposes, forced sale of wool and animals, and use of their lands. At the time when llamas, alpacas, and sheep were sheered, each peasant was forced to bring to the caserío of the hacienda an amount of quintals of wool according to the amount of animals owned. The hacendado paid twelve Bolivian pesos (less than 8 soles in Peruvian currency) per quintal of sheep wool, about half the current market value. Those who did not have animals had to acquire money and buy a certain amount of wool for the same price, meaning that they had to pay for the difference between the actual cost of wool and the price set by the hacendado. All of this was what the contribuciones had morphed into at the beginning of the twentieth century: various modalities of labor appropriation, draconian extortions in the market place, the loss of land, animals, and irrigation. How it happened is part of my story.

The massacre of December 1916 was a response to Indians' complaints⁸, and began a long cycle of peasant upheavals in Puno, when other communities, parcialidades, distritos, and provincias witnessed similar episodes. Violence had reached a peak, comparable maybe only to the years preceding the Tupac Amaru II rebellion in the 1780s. Land, animals, and labor, together with the abuses of power related to both, were the key ingredients of mounting violence in Puno. The history of the build-up toward this confrontational ending is spread throughout the nineteenth century.

Research on the political behavior of peasants has a long historiographical tradition, especially in terms of peasants' "revolutionary transformatory poten-

form adobes (150 each person), clean ditches. When Indians did not show up in time for these tasks, overseers (capataces or mayordomos) and quipos would use their whips and sticks to punish them.

These are the terms given in the editorial article written by Dora Mayer, reproduced in the lawsuit proceedings. As will be seen, many more categories existed and were used throughout the nineteenth century, notwithstanding the fact that by 1887 free services (servicios gratuitos) had been abolished. In his memoria of 1888, subprefecto of Puno, Octavio Diez Canseco, actually claimed that due to the abolition of free services he was unable to recruit gobernadores: "Abolidos los servicios gratuitos elemento poderoso de explotación para los Gobernadores y sus subalternos, son muy pocos los Distritos donde puedan encontrarse ciudadanos patriotas que se hagan cargo de esos pueblos". BN. D 4569, 1888. This means either exploitation was possible or a lot of patriotism had to exist to fill in these positions. What subprefecto Diez Canseco did not talk about is that gobernadores withheld contribuciones payments, both legally and illegally.

⁸ After having sent the petition to Lima, Indians from various communities met in the parcialidad Soratira, and decided to send a delegation to Lima to inquire about the results of their complaints. During this meeting gendarmes and hacendado employees appeared at the parcialidad. The assembled Indians fled in horror while the gendarmes took twelve prisoners, among them women and children, whom they took to the caserío. Following them, the comunarios of the parcialidad walked to the hacienda San José and when they arrived they were persecuted and chased down with rifles. Those injured were then killed with knives until an armed force coming from Azangaro reached the place and the butchery stopped. After this force left, the employees of hacendados Bernardino Arias Echenique, Jose Sebastian Urquiaga, Carlos Sarmiento, Alejandro Choquehuanca, and Daniel R. Zavala made the bodies disappear. They dug a huge hole (fosa) to bury the 29 victims. There —wrote Azangaro's Indians— "lie the pariahs who requested justice". To cover up the killing, the hacendados —in complicity with the judges and the subprefecto— opened a file against the Indians accusing them of instigating a rebellion, in the name of which —of course— they had to be put down.

tial” and their ability to become citizens and partakers in newly established nation-states. Aside from being peasants and landowners, in the Andean region the rural landscape is marked by a significant presence of Indians, to a point where very often Indians and peasants are referred to interchangeably. This overlap, in turn, tends to blur processes of social and economic differentiation in the ranks of peasants and landowners living inside and outside of peasant communities (or ayllus). Moreover, as shown in chapter IV through a re-reading of tax registers (padrones de contribuyentes), ayllus could be organized like haciendas, as much as haciendas could function as ayllus. Another noteworthy aspect of differentiation and political participation is that entire ayllus are represented by their local leaders (mandones, hilacatas) with ayllus having a large say in who is a good or a bad gobernador or subprefecto. In some instances, we will see groups of Indians walk into the office of the highest political and military state representative, the prefecto.

There was an ongoing dialogue between landowners, local powerholders, and indigenous peasants. Local powerholders were state representatives, as alcaldes, gobernadores, subprefectos, and prefectos. What they conveyed to indigenous peasants was meticulously followed by indigenous peasants themselves, constantly seeking to expand the dialogue with the state, the government in Lima. We still know little about the dialogue between the state and indigenous peasants, because there is an assumption that indigenous peasants’ voices were either silenced or mediated by local powerholders, who for the most time also were the large landowners in the provincial highlands. A parallel argument holds that throughout most of the nineteenth century the Peruvian state simply was looking in a different direction, ignoring what local elites did or what indigenous peasants wanted, needed, and proposed. This, I found out after several years of archival research, does not reflect reality. The nineteenth century was much more inward looking than is usually imagined, in large measure because much more happened inside the country than what was brought in from outside or was turned into an ‘outside’ in the wake of the creation of borders between Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile⁹. Peasants’ political outlooks can hardly be labelled as sporadic, inorganic, or as being locally isolated, pre-political, neither in the eighteenth, nor in the nineteenth or even in the twentieth centuries.

The implementation of the liberal Cadiz Constitution since 1810, followed by the wars of independence roughly between 1812 (Manuel Belgrano’s and Juan José Castelli’s first attempts to cross the Andes out of Buenos Aires) and 1825 (when the last remnants of the royalist army were defeated in Upper Peru (Bolivia), to the failed attempt to create the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation (1836-1839) under the leadership of Andrés de Santa Cruz, up to the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) between Chile on one side, and Peru and Bolivia on the other, were

⁹ Although Marcela Calisto’s research deals with the political history of Puno in the twentieth century, her thesis, is probably the closest in answering the questions posed. Calisto worked with me in organizing the prefectural archive in Puno, that is, our readings of the political history of Puno are based on the same kind of documentation. The research took place in the Prefectural Archive in Puno (APPu) between 1987 and 1990. Her dissertation advisor at UCSD was colleague Michael Monteón.

historical moments of internal conflict that heightened the tensions between state interests and local interests. Indigenous peasants participated in very precise ways in all these nation-encompassing events. What they did, how they did it, and what they thought about what they did, and what others did to them reflect their evolving relationships with the Peruvian (and sometimes Bolivian) state and the multilayered relationships they construed with local elites. Such relationships were very visible to the officers of the Peruvian army who fought in these wars at the very local level and who (sometimes) became high national political figures. Visibility pertained to all groups participating in a sordid dialogue. The large-looming question is how such obvious visibility on all sides transmuted—in the course of the nineteenth century—into a discourse in which indigenous peasants at the end became bracketed out of the discussion. How did Indian “Peruanos” at the beginning of the nineteenth century transmute into uncivilized and “unpatriotic” barbarians in the twentieth century?

Over the past two decades, from a historiographical point of view, we have developed our understandings and tools to grasp the mechanisms of political relations and conflict, violence, and (also) cooperation; the roles of individuals and social groups in these processes, as much as the discursive reasoning that comes with it. Invaluable and helpful concepts like ‘political consciousness’, ‘moral economy’, ‘imagined community’, ‘hegemony and counterhegemony’, and (why not?) ‘rational choice’ have brought back to the drawing board research sites and research topics that were thought of as being exhausted. Key to these concepts and the historiographical discussions surrounding it, is the definition of what the ‘political’ and a ‘political intention’ are and what can historically be determined as being a political act or action.

In the Puno context a political act or action was not dissimulating, footdragging, feigned ignorance, slander, sabotage (Scott, 1985:29), or in the Andean case, thefts of livestock and attacks on haciendas, but the very purposeful act of questioning, disobeying, and even attacking the words and deeds of local authorities, as the local representatives of the state. In doing so, what Puno’s Indians also did, is unveiling their own thoughts about how they envisioned their political and economic participation in the emerging nation-state. Even in moments of relative political tranquility, Indian peasants continued pursuing actions to improve their own situation, exert control over what local authorities did (often on behalf of a more remotely located state) (Walker, 1989:174ff), and maintained an open dialogue—if necessary with the Peruvian president himself—. Important in terms of political acts and actions in the Andean context, especially in the Southern Andes, is the continued existence of levels of solidarity built into peasant-indigenous communally organized communities, in spite of the workings of peasant differentiation and hierarchies within it (Albo, 1986; Magagna, 1991). ‘Class’, mainly understood as an economically nucleating concept, is not the only group-organizational principle leading to political acts and actions. In the Andean case it was mainly ethnicity, race, and communal solidarity based, in turn, on common decision-making and a sense of reciprocal duties. However, as will be seen, such expressions of solidarity could sometimes also be undercut from within.




Puno, because of its demographic composition, its centrality to political action, and its economic importance, has deserved more attention than other regions in Peru. The fine publications by Tamayo Herrera (1982), Jacobsen (1993), Calisto (1993), and Rénique (2004) come to mind. In spite of their detailed and insightful analysis, these works provide us with a thin political reading on the ground as acted out in the relationships between a differentiated set of indigenous peasants and landowners, different kinds of local elites, and the different contact zones with the emerging nation state in the long nineteenth century. Especially in Puno, it is not only indigenous peasants who were culturally and linguistically, and economically and geographically fragmented, but also the elites. Elites quarreled among themselves, occasionally even killed each other, and overall, defended different mindsets and behaved differently when it came to the large indigenous majority, the control of fiscal resources, and more generally, the quest for power. How and why one kind of mindset and behavior ended up predominating at the end of the century, is part of what is portrayed herein, with an increasingly repressive state, with thousands of people being physically annihilated, entire communities erased, and peasant leaders dispersed, incarcerated, or killed. Concomitantly, the end of the nineteenth century scenario provided local powerholders with *the* opportunity to further grab peasants' and communal lands and more Indian labor and services. This outcome—based on a reading of political relationships in the nineteenth century—was not a given. It could have been otherwise, based on how different kinds of peasants and elites had earlier participated in varied political realms.

The dismantlement of 'lo indígena' in Puno in the early decades of the twentieth century, was followed—as an initiative of the Peruvian state—by the establishment of the "Brigadas de Culturización". In 1940, when Manuel Prado, a member of Peru's upper class and the head of what Portocarrero (1987) has called the "Prado Empire" was governing Peru, the Division of Indigenous Affairs (Sección de Asuntos Indígenas) in the Ministry for Development (Ministerio de Fomento) published a report signed by Juan Francisco Deza G., the chief (jefe) of the First Brigade of Indigenous Communities in Puno (Primera Brigada de Comunidades Indígenas en Puno). Their main nation-wide mission was to educate and teach hygiene to Indian peasants and to find out what the economic developmental potential of the communities were, in lieu of a national census, the first one after 1876.

With microphones and loudspeakers in hand, the members of the Brigada made their mandates publicly known. Specific visits to peasant communities followed the announcements, and once in the communities, the Puno-Brigada assembled Indian peasants in 255 different locations throughout Puno's provincias. According to chief Deza:

"we have tried to inculcate in them—according to the regulation that describes our duties— notions of civic education, economic culture, we have carried out a hygiene campaign [equivalent to cutting the hair of indigenous children and distributing combs and soap], and we have developed themes concerning education, and we have carried out social studies by reading reality".

Peru and Bolivia, 19th century



In sum, he concluded, “we have tried to cover the multiple aspects of the Indian problem”¹⁰. And, what was —according to Deza— the ‘Indian problem’? A wrong perception of what fatherland (*patria*), the national flag, or the coat of arms (*escudo*) were, and that Indians did not know who their *gobernador* was, not to speak about not knowing the good intentions the current president had for them. It was indeed in 1940 that the Peruvian national anthem was first translated into Quechua and Aymara.

That Indians in Puno did not know who the president or the *gobernador* were withstands all historical proof to the contrary. In any case if there were some Indians who did not know better, they were of the lucky few who had not suffered extortions, corruption, or neglect. Such gross misrepresentations are a part of what this book wants to explain (and set straight).

It is in even more recent times that such misrepresentations are being voiced. Ten years after Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán was arrested, we hear and

¹⁰ Reproduced in Pinto, 1978:168. My translation.

read renowned Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa proclaim in his assessment of why eight reporters were killed in Uchuraccay that the culprits were the indigenous locals because of their barbarism and ignorance (part of what he labelled, the “archaic utopia”). Wasn’t this one of the potent arguments the Council of the Indies and Spanish colonizers and bureaucrats used to justify the subordination of entire civilizations, indeed very far removed from barbarism and ignorance? Doesn’t it remind us of the accusations of former Peruvian president Alan García Pérez against Amazonian indigenous organizations when he plainly proclaims that natural resources in the Amazon Basin belong to all Peruvians (to the Peruvian state, in particular!) without respecting ancestral occupation of the land and cultural difference?

In more general terms, by reopening our reading of Puno’s history, I am also re-opening the broader issue of in how far culture, politics, and economic interests intersect. Culture is not meant to include essentializing cultural indigenous or creole traits but is meant as being a dynamic process by which political cultures are formed and interact based on a continued and longterm dialogue. Politics are meant to signify the instruments of the exercise of power, as much as the uses and misuses of power by the interacting parties in specific historical contexts. Economic interests are the existing, pursued, and expected benefits from the use of politics embedded in (and reflecting) political cultures, the force and farce of politics. Fiscal issues and relationships are key to understanding how these multi-layered dialogues are structured. In what might be called tributary theory, it has long been established, that fiscal instruments and objectives are far from being neutral or value-empty. The choice of fiscal instruments and its ultimate goals are not ateleological (Herschel, 1972:138)¹¹.

Such intersections reveal themselves most prominently in three interconnected realms: fiscal exactions (chapter II), with changing names (Indian headtax, indigenous tribute, *contribuciones indígenas*, *contribuciones rústicas*) over the course of the nineteenth century and with a clear morphology toward equating fiscal exactions with demands for free labor; the procurement of provisions (chapter VI), and military recruitment (chapter VII) during times of civil and across the border wars. All three realms of exactions —as will be seen— were closely intertwined and interdependent. The most pressing of these realms pertains to fiscal exactions, largely because the main pattern of regional accumulation and political articulation was based on the existence of indigenous taxpayers, in war and no-war contexts.

Contrary to what our present wisdom is, namely, that president Ramón Castilla promised and then abolished the Indian headtax in 1854 as a result of the

¹¹ Federico J. Herschel wrote a critical essay on the papers presented at a conference organized by the Programa de Finanzas Públicas of the OAS (OEA). Herschel was a member of CEPAL. The conference took place in Mexico City between September 4 and 9, 1972, and it was the third of its kind. Tributary instruments and objectives were discussed as mechanisms of development (including social development). Herschel’s insights provide a fine theoretical underpinning to tributary issues and their implications on external commerce, as a determinant of the levels and structure of consumption, land, productivity, the optimal combination of labor and capital, the distribution of income, and the level and structure of investments.

civil confrontation between his troops and those of Rufino Echenique and new available fiscal resources through guano exports, at the level of the departamento, the contribuciones of colonial origin lasted well into the twentieth century and largely marked the pace and directions of regional developments.

In chapter I, I ask who the local bureaucrats were and how they positioned themselves vis a vis the large peasant majority and among themselves, especially at a time when many of the former Spanish powerholders had left the country after the wars of independence or had switched sides. This is a largely unanswered question¹² and stands at the very beginning of our understanding of how the new (now republican) state came into being. This chapter is followed by an analysis of fiscal revenues and expenditures, the fiscal Lima-Puno connection throughout the entire nineteenth century, followed by three chapters analyzing the different repercussions contribuciones impinged on each of Puno's, back then, five provincias at three different historical moments. These four chapters are followed by some thoughts on the relationship between taxes and free services and provisions (chapter VI) and the connections between military recruitment and taxes (chapter VII). As a result, we encounter a whole gammut of situations and dialogues that describe in very fine-grained terms what people thought and did, and why. The final picture is a sense of the variegated (lost) political possibilities laying on the table throughout the nineteenth century that could have had a different outcome.

¹² Maybe with the exception of Walker's and Guardino's work (1988) and Stern's contributions (1987).

CHAPTER I

ADMINISTERING THE DEPARTAMENTO

Since the Age of Revolution especially the French Revolution (1789) and the United States' independence (1783), Europe and the Americas debated what kind of political system could/would replace monarchical power. In the wake of the wars of independence in Central and South America, old and new leaders sought to find and establish an alternative political system along more liberal and less monarchical lines, while at the same time rebuilding war-devastated economies. What happened in the first decades after independence, including decisions about what kind of political economy to pursue shaped Latin America's destiny for a long time to come. Although the new national elites proved to be quite assertive about the overarching goal of turning their respective countries into "repúblicas" under a more or less liberal model, the translation of such ideas into complex social settings was mainly based on trial and error¹. In this continued struggle, the ways in which *contribuciones* (exactions, taxes) were legislated and handled was a key element to explain the republics' political and economic evolution.

Much still needs to be learned about how the new states re-invented themselves and how the decision-making process leading to this re-invention was construed. Which colonial practices were unchanged and which were altered? Did the local bureaucrats and priests operate as they had before independence? Did their mindsets and interests change? What was it that had to be or could be administered or, put differently, how did local reality change their prospects as part of the laws of the new nation-states?

Today, Peru is administratively and geographically divided into 23 departamentos². Puno is one of them, on the shores of Lake Titicaca and the border with

¹ A look at the 24 volumes of decrees, memorias, laws, and budgets compiled by Pedro Emilio Dancuart and J.M. Rodriguez between 1821 and 1895, published first in 1905 and re-edited in 1926 (Lima: Litografía y Tipografía T. Scheuch) tell a long story about the impasses encountered and the disconnect between legal devices and lived reality, especially when it came to legislate internal issues (censos, capellanías, mining, land, etc.) and revenues (especially the Indian headtax and the many "contribuciones" the state attempted to regulate and impose on its peoples). Messages and solutions pertaining to Peru's foreign economic, political and social relations, are much more transparent, accurate, holistic, and expeditious. Volumes I-X (1821-1876) were edited and commented by Dancuart; volumes XI-XXIV (1877-1895) by Rodriguez.

² I prefer to use the Spanish wording when writing about demarcations, bureaucratic positions, and institutions, largely because "department" or "province" or else, do not have the same connotations in English.

Bolivia, at altitudes ranging from 6,000 to 15,000 feet above sea level. Since the post-independence period, departamentos are divided into provincias and each provincia contains several distritos, which, in turn, are composed of many pueblos (villages), municipalities, and hamlets (caseríos). In the political-administrative structure, until very recently³, a prefecto was in charge of a departamento, a subprefecto of a provincia, and a gobernador of a distrito, very much following the Napoleonic political-administrative divides, at least in its wording. Between around 1786 and 1826, in the wake and the aftermath of the Bourbon Reforms, intendentes (the French intendants) superseded the powers of prefectos, subprefectos, and even gobernadores in their political and economic roles, a reason for which in the documentation (both legal and in the official correspondence) they appear interspersed and, sometimes carrying overlapping and contradicting mandates (Pietschmann, 1982, 1983)⁴. Prefectos also were the highest military and police commanders in the departamentos. In fact, in the first decades after independence most prefectos were white and mestizo army officers and navy commanders who knew the territory and the people as a result of their participation in the wars of independence. Alcaldes (mayors) and regidores (advisors to mayors), stood at the lower end of the state's official bureaucratic ladder and, especially in highland provincias, often were Indians and mestizos, who transmitted state decrees and orders to local indigenous leaders (hilacatas, mandones, caciques, curacas, recaudadores) in charge of collecting the headtax. Alcaldes and regidores were not always the first state representatives to hear or listen to the complaints and propositions proffered by indigenous leaders and peasants. Indigenous (and sometimes mestizo) leaders were the direct link to indigenous households and communities. Over the course of the nineteenth century, indigenous households and communities paid (or resisted paying) a varied set of changing exactions. How all these historical actors construed their complex relationships is an interesting story about the multiple and multifaceted levels of communication between the central government in Lima and its hinterlands and of how power constellations at the local level were liberally molded and contested.

1. STATE ADMINISTRATORS, TERRITORIAL DEMARCATION, AND EXACTIONS

Over time, the number and geography of the provincias in Puno (and in other departamentos) changed, as did the number and administrative boundaries of the distritos. New geographical and administrative demarcations resulted from often heated congressional debates, and were preceded by discussions between congressional representatives and local powerholders (often one and the same

³ Since around 2012, Peru is undergoing a process of "re-territorialization" in an effort at political and budgetary decentralization.

⁴ The *Revista de Indias* published a monographic issue (vol. LXVI, no. 236, 2006) on "networks of power" in Peru, mainly presenting thoughts on the workings of colonial power relations. Contributors to this issue were: Guillermo Lohmann Villena, Antonio Acosta, Manfredi Merluzzi, Susan E. Ramirez, Jose de la Puente Brunke, Pedro Guibovich Perez, Victor Peralta, Carmen McEvoy, Rafael Varon Gabai, and Alfonso W. Quiros.

person). Before independence some negotiation over boundaries took place but real changes came as dictates from the Council of the Indies and followed fiscal interests. Changing boundaries were an important level of dialogue between the seat of government in Lima and departmento elites as each change had implications on economic possibilities and performance as much as on social and political arrangements and re-alignments. At the heart of the debate about demarcation lay access to a larger or smaller number of taxpayers, also determined by population increases or declines and migration patterns.

Prior to the new republican administrative structure, Puno was divided into five *corregimientos*, about the size of the future *provincias* (Lampa, Carabaya, Azangaro, Chucuito, and Puno), creating after the Bourbon Reforms the *Intendencia de Puno*⁵, temporarily also called the *Intendencia de La Paz*. With the changed demarcation came the incorporation of Puno into Upper Peru (Bolivia, the *Audiencia of Charcas*), and the *Audiencia Charcas* became part of the *Rio de la Plata Viceroyalty* (what later became Uruguay, Argentina, and Paraguay). Before 1786, Upper Peru had been part of the Peruvian Viceroyalty (*Virreinato del Peru*). As a consequence, between 1786 and 1807, the year Buenos Aires declared its independence from Spain, Buenos Aires, instead of Lima, became the main export center for silver and silver coins originating in the mines and minting installations in Upper Peru (especially Potosi). Changed territorial and administrative demarcations meant the loss of one of the main fiscal revenues coming from the royal fifth⁶ for the colonial state headquartered in Lima. In addition, when administrative boundaries shifted, indigenous tribute payers had to respond to new tax collectors and, the exactions paid entered a different circuit of exchange, effecting a new upward network of those delivering taxes before they entered state coffers. This process resurfaced after Peru and Bolivia declared independence.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century the *Intendencia de Puno* counted 186,682 inhabitants (Ramos, 1982:30) of which approximately 30,000 were classified as Indian tribute payers. With the establishment of the Bolivian Republic in 1825, Puno became part of the Peruvian Republic, maintaining strong links to Bolivia in spite of several attempts undertaken by the respective governments at tightening the newly established border: signing commercial agreements, inaugurating diplomatic positions (consuls) on both sides of the border, and the construction of custom facilities. What had been fluid political and economic relationships, now became attacks on each other's sovereignty and a tariffs and contraband war zone⁷.

For a brief period (1836-1839), the separation of the former viceregal space into different countries was discontinued during the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation, spearheaded by former independence general and now Bolivian president *Mariscal Andres de Santa Cruz* (1792-1865). It was a territorial-geographical re-demarcation attempt to curb endemic civil wars in Peru tending to spill over

⁵ According to historian Augusto Ramos Zambrano (1982), the inclusion of the Puno-*corregimientos* to the *Intendencia de La Paz*, was based on a *Real Cedula* of August 2, 1784 and of art. 118 of the *Real Ordenanza* of August 1786.

⁶ The *quinto real* represented twenty percent of coined silver pesos.

⁷ Among other issues, these aspects of public policy are presented in Dancuart and Rodríguez (1905, 1926).

into Bolivia (but also Ecuador, Colombia, and Chile). Puno, located at the border with Bolivia became anew one of the main battle sites; the departamento had been a major participant during and after the wars of independence and was again drawn into armed conflict during the War of the Pacific (1879-1884). In between (1866-67), an upheaval began in the provincia of Huancane. As will be seen, it was markedly during these years of heightened internal and international conflict when the collection of exactions intensified dramatically and that the paper trail concerning exactions and military mobilization filled the desks of gobernadores, subprefectos, and prefectos, moving upwards to the Departmental Treasuries (Tesorerías Departamentales) and the Ministry of Public Finances (Ministerio de la Hacienda Pública) in Lima. Most affected by these incremental surges of exactions were the indigenous people living on the border, not only in terms of the monetary exactions themselves, but also in terms of the concomitant military recruitment and the continued request for donations (donaciones) in kind and money, often meaning the violent confiscation of peasants' assets and produce, in the form of provisions for the army (bagajes), more extensively discussed later on.

A more enduring administrative and political organization of Puno came with a dictatorial decree issued on May 2, 1845 by Mariscal Ramón Castilla y Marquesado (1797-1867) in Cusco. Puno-provincia became divided into 12 distritos, with Puno-city as the provincia's capital city; the departamento was organized into six provincias: Puno, Azangaro, Carabaya, Chucuito, Huancane, and Lampa. This political-administrative scheme would, with minor changes, persist until the century's end.

Until 1850, the departamento Puno was second in population only to the departamento of Cusco. According to the national census carried out that year, Puno counted 286,148 inhabitants (around 100,000 more than the Intendencia Puno toward the end of the eighteenth century), Cusco 346,211 and the departamento Lima that held Peru's capital city Lima, only had 180,923 inhabitants⁸. A census undertaken in 1862 shows a total of 224,678 inhabitants for Puno-departamento and the national census of 1876, 259,449 people (Romero, 1928:228; Ramos, 1982:30). In the decades after 1850, Puno's population decreased from its 1850 level. Since the number of inhabitants determined the amount of the headtax, there is a direct correlation between changing demographics and the amount of fiscal revenues. By 1896, Puno's population had more than doubled to 537,345 people⁹. Demographic growth slowed down after the turn of the century, in tandem with the decreasing fiscal importance of contribuciones as part of the national budget. The 1940 census registered a slim population increase from 1896, counting 548,371 inhabitants in Puno (Ramos: 1982:30). Between the end of the nineteenth century and 1940 several indigenous upheavals took place in Puno, followed by repression and massacres (Maltby, 1972; Calisto, 1993; Renique, 2004), which might (at least partially) explain the smaller population increase.

⁸ Censo de Almas de la República, 1850, published in the newspaper "El Peruano", no. 18, 1850. Romero (1928:225) and Ramos (1982:30) provide a number of 230,797 inhabitants for Puno in 1854; no source is given.

⁹ For nine years later, 1905, Romero (1928:228) registers an estimated 534,775 people.